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The Real (Sentencing) World:
State Sentencing in the Post-Blakely Era
Douglas A. Berman* and Steven L. Chanenson**
Soon after the Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington1 declared certain
judicial fact-finding within a state sentencing guideline system unconstitutional,
Justice O’Connor described the Court’s decision as a “Number 10 earthquake.”2
Leading commentator Frank Bowman called Blakely a train wreck,3 and many
others recognized the profound potential ramifications of Blakely for modern
sentencing reforms.4 Blakely engendered such reactions in part because it was
something of a throwback to the era of the Warren Court: as in cases like Gideon v
Wainwright5 and Miranda v Arizona,6 a group of Justices in Blakely announced a
bold and dramatic interpretation of the Bill of Rights that would require many
states to modify traditional and long-established criminal justice practices.7
But two years after the Blakely ruling, the case’s broader impact and meaning
for criminal justice systems around the country has been largely overshadowed by
developments in the federal sentencing system. Despite the fact that Blakely
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1
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2
See Senate, Judges Urge ‘Blakely’ Redux, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 2004, at 2 (quoting Justice
O’Connor’s comment at the Ninth Circuit’s annual conference in July 2004 that the Blakely case
“looks like a Number 10 earthquake”).
3
See Frank O. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2004).
4
See generally Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1;
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 316 (2004).
5
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7
See Robert Weisberg, A Quiet Bombshell in the Legal World, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006
(describing Blakely as a ruling that has taken its place, like Gideon and Miranda, as a “precedent that
would change the course of American criminal justice”). Cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical
Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493 (2006) (drawing various
connections between the work of the Warren Court and the Blakely ruling). For a fascinating set of
recent articles reflecting on the criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court, see Symposium, The
Warren Court Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1
(2005).
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evaluated state sentencing procedures, a great deal of the resulting buzz revolved
around how this decision might affect the federal scheme. Indeed, much of the
legal world waited with baited breath for the Supreme Court to determine the
application of Blakely to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in United States v.
Booker,8 and has subsequently fawned over what Booker means and how Congress
could or should respond.
The symposium in this issue of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law seeks
to ensure that the broader stories of Blakely and modern state sentencing reforms
get the attention they merit. Looking ahead to future Supreme Court rulings and
looking back on post-Blakely developments, contributors to this Symposium enrich
our understanding of Blakely’s impact and enhance the insights to be drawn from
state sentencing reform efforts.
I. SPOTLIGHTING THE STATES
State courts handle many more criminal cases than the federal courts.9 State
sentencing procedures touch the lives of many more defendants, victims and
witnesses than the federal sentencing system. Yet, these realities often get lost in
all the attention paid to the federal sentencing system in the era of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, perhaps because the federal system is in everyone’s
backyard whether that backyard is in Manhattan or Montana. Especially in the
academic world, there is seemingly endless interest in federal sentencing law and
practices, but precious little discussion of state sentencing reforms generally or of
developments in particular states.10
State sentencing is under-examined in part because state systems are difficult
to comprehensively analyze, either individually or collectively. While sharing
important similarities, state sentencing systems are diverse and can often be
difficult to understand fully.11 The backdrop for state sentencing is often dynamic:
some states have not completed long-needed criminal code revisions or recodifications, others have relatively modern (though rarely model) penal codes,
8

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
In 2002, less than 65,000 of the 1,114,217 felony convictions in the United States were in
the federal criminal justice system, meaning that state court counted for 94% of the adult felony
convictions in the United States. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1 (2004),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf.
10
There are a few notable exceptions. At the top of the too short list of those academics who
have written extensively about state sentencing systems are Professors Richard Frase, Marc Miller,
Kevin Reitz, and Ronald Wright. Cf. Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for
Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1354 n.8 (2005) (identifying Professors Frase, Reitz and Wright as academics
taking state sentencing seriously).
11
See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1191 (2005).
9
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and every state is regularly adding new offenses and sentencing terms. The impact
of state sentencing is often opaque: most states do a poor job of producing
accessible crime and sentencing information,12 thus making state systems hard to
examine and assess from a distance.
Nevertheless, in light of popular rhetoric about the virtues of federalism and
frequent references to states as laboratories,13 federal policy-makers and academics
ought to care greatly about what states are actually doing in the realm of
sentencing. States are doing quite a bit, and have been doing quite a bit for quite a
long time. Starting more than twenty-five years ago, states pioneered structured
sentencing in the form of guidelines, with Minnesota, Pennsylvania and
Washington leading the way.14 More recently, many states have developed
innovative ways to handle a variety of offenders and offenses through drug courts,
intermediate and alternative punishments, and re-entry initiatives.15 Numerous
states have long moved past the seemingly binary morass of prison or probation in
which much of the federal system continues to languish.16
II. SUPREME INTERVENTION
The Supreme Court recently has paid a lot of attention to state sentencing:
through Apprendi v. New Jersey17 in 2000 and Blakely v. Washington18 in 2004, the
Supreme Court declared certain state sentencing procedures unconstitutional. And
yet, these landmark rulings have, in various ways, reflected federal input and a
federal imprint. At oral argument in Blakely, more time was spent discussing the
operation of the federal sentencing guidelines than the guidelines in operation in

12
See Miller, supra note 10, at 1354 (“State legislators, state sentencing commissioners, and
state commission staff have generally not tried to make information about individual sentences or
about their sentencing systems reasonably accessible.”).
13
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”).
14
See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 70 (1999); see also Appendix: A
Summary of the Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania Guidelines, in THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987).
15
See generally Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From
Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831
(2000).
16
See generally NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990).
17
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
18
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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Washington.19 The opinions in Apprendi and Blakely—especially those of the
dissenting Justices—seemed most concerned about what these rulings meant for
the federal sentencing guidelines.20 As noted before, the loudest and most
persistent buzz following these decisions concerned their possible impact on the
federal sentencing system.
The direct and indirect impact of Apprendi and especially Blakely in the states
is a rich and dynamic story, with many facets and lessons that should not be
overlooked. 21 Especially since Blakely was decided in June 2004, state
legislatures and state courts have, with divergent results, grappled with the
Supreme Court’s modern sentencing jurisprudence. Though the diverse state
reactions to Blakely are not easily summarized, it is fair to characterize a division
between states of “evolution” and states of “denial.”22 Evolution states have
accepted that Blakely affects their sentencing regimes, and responded in ways
seeking to fit local circumstances. In contrast, denial states, acting through their
state supreme courts, have resisted seemingly strong arguments that Blakely
impacts their structured sentencing systems.
The Supreme Court is partially responsible for some of the post-Blakely
confusion as a result of its follow-up decision in Booker, which engineered an
“advisory guidelines” remedy for the federal system to preserve a significant role
for judicial fact-finding at sentencing. Relying heavily on Booker, several state
supreme courts—namely California, New Mexico, and Tennessee—have declared
that their structured sentencing systems, which rely significantly on judicial factfinding, do not need mending after Blakely.23
By granting review in California v. Cunningham this past spring, the Supreme
Court brings these issues to the national stage. Cunningham explores the
constitutionality of California’s structured sentencing system after the California
Supreme Court decided that Booker suggested the state’s sentencing procedures
are constitutionally sound.24 California is not a guidelines state, but it has a
statutory structured sentencing system that provides for three sentencing tiers
(lower, middle and upper). At issue in Cunningham is the imposition of “upper
term” sentences, which are only available after a trial judge finds the existence of
19

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-

1632).
20

See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 429–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523–
54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21
See generally The State of Blakely in the States, FED. SENT’G REP. Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005);
Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as a Structural Limit on Errors,
94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003).
22
See Steven L. Chanenson & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Evolution and Denial: State Sentencing
After Blakely and Booker, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2005) (sorting State jurisdictions after Blakely into
ones of “evolution” or “denial”).
23
See id. at 3 (discussing state rulings in California, New Mexico, and Tennessee).
24
See People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005).
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an aggravating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. At first blush, the
California Supreme Court’s preservation of this system seems to disregard
Blakely’s declaration that the jury must find statutory-maximum-enhancing facts.
Cunningham could be seen as little more than an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to indicate that “[it] meant what [it] said and [it] said what [it] meant”25 in
Blakely.
But Professors Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas highlight in their article
that much more is at stake in Cunningham. Writing directly to the Supreme Court,
Berman and Bibas catalogue competing principles in play within sentencing
systems and they spotlight the broader importance of how the Court approaches
Cunningham. Berman and Bibas express concern that the Supreme Court’s recent
formalistic and rigid approach to the Sixth Amendment could “strangl[e]
democratic innovation and can disserve procedural justice and defendants’
interests.”26 They urge the Court to bring greater flexibility and nuance to its
sentencing jurisprudence because states, “which sentence most defendants, serve
as laboratories of democratic experimentation and need room to try novel
sentencing arrangements.”27
Yet, Cunningham may be another state sentencing case in which a federal
subtext looms large. California is defending its sentencing system by arguing that
it operates as a state equivalent to the federal sentencing system after Booker.
Consequently, it will be hard for the Justices to avoid pondering the federal
implications of its work in Cunningham. Indeed, if the Supreme Court delivers a
broad ruling, it may provide a glimpse into the application of advisory guidelines
and reasonableness review in the federal system after Booker.28 The Court could
also tip its hand in Cunningham as to what other issues stemming from the
Apprendi-Blakely-Booker line are likely to capture its imagination and space on its
docket.29

25

DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 16 (1940).
Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 37, 38 (2006).
27
Id.
28
See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Cunningham: Why Federal Practitioners and Policy Makers
Should Pay Attention, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 260 (2006).
29
The Supreme Court has also agreed to hear argument this November addressing the
retroactivity of Blakely to state criminal sentences in Burton v. Waddington. It is interesting to note
that the Petitioner in Burton is stressing the importance of the state, opposed to federal, character of
the sentence in that case. Brief for the Petitioner, Burton v. Waddington, 22–23, No. 05-9222 (2006).
One is left to wonder whether the strong state sentencing focus of Burton is part of the reason that
case has not gotten much attention. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Press Coverage of Cert Grant in
Burton, Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
2006/06/press_coverage_.html (noting that the mainstream media “has just a little coverage” of the
Burton cert. grant).
26
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III. SEEING THE REFORM FOREST AMONG THE DOCTRINAL TREES
The doctrinal uncertainty and confusion produced by Blakely and Booker
makes it dangerously easy for jurisdictions to be concerned primarily with
technical problems in particular sentencing laws rather than with broader reform
issues. But the Supreme Court’s coming work in Cunningham, like Blakely before
it, should motivate state legislatures, courts, and sentencing commissions to reexamine and improve their sentencing systems.30 The two other contributions to
this symposium spotlight the reform stories that should not get lost in any debate
about the particularities and peculiarities of the Supreme Court’s modern
sentencing jurisprudence.
Whatever one thinks about the Supreme Court’s modern Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court’s efforts merit praise for engendering a robust national
dialogue on sentencing law, policy, procedures, and practices. From a practical
perspective, such a dialogue is long overdue because federal and state prison
populations have swelled in the last two decades, reaching record-highs nearly
every year.31 Is this the result legislatures desired? Is it a wise policy? A
conversation at this level is vital. From a conceptual perspective, a national
sentencing dialogue is also long overdue because the theories, structures, and
procedures for modern sentencing decision-making have not been seriously
rethought following the modern rejection of a now seemingly antiquated
rehabilitative sentencing philosophy.32 Particularly at the macro level, our
sentencing structures should flow from our punishment purposes. The critical
links between sentencing purposes and means also merits serious discussion.
States should capitalize on the renewed attention that Cunningham brings to
muster the political support to examine thoroughly existing sentencing systems and
to fix what needs fixing.
Pragmatism, practicalities and politics drive many state sentencing reforms.33
State policy makers want to follow the Constitution, of course, but many
justifiably recognize that the Constitution sets only relatively wide outer
boundaries of permissible sentencing structures and laws. Policy makers are often
less concerned with constitutional restrictions, especially as they juggle competing
goals such as crime control, fiscal limitations, uniformity, and individualization,
and confront the long-standing struggle for criminal justice hegemony between the
legislature and the judiciary. Professor Michael Tonry has elegantly described one
aspect of this perpetual balancing act:
30

Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 379 (2005).
See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 1 (May 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf.
32
See Berman, supra note 4, at 2–3 .
33
See, e.g., Berman & Bibas, supra note 26 at 62; Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding
the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 7 (2005).
31
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Like all calls for just the right amount of anything, not too much and not
too little, a proposal for sentencing standards that are constraining
enough to assure that like cases are treated alike and flexible enough to
assure that different cases are treated differently is a counsel of
unattainable perfection. Nonetheless, that is probably what most people
would want to see in a just system of sentencing . . . .34
In addition to recognizing that sentencing perfection is unattainable, states can
and should appreciate that certain structures for developing sentencing law and
policy have proven particularly effective in achieving sentencing improvements.
Specifically, as the American Law Institute is stressing in its on-going revision of
the sentencing part of the Model Penal Code,35 a vigorous, representative and wellfunded sentencing commission offers the best hope for developing and refining a
fair and responsive sentencing system.36
Creating and empowering a sentencing commission closes few, if any,
substantive options for state sentencing systems. The resulting sentences urged by
a sentencing commission can be comparatively high and tightly controlled by a
central authority. In contrast, sentences can also be set relatively low and
sentencing decisions can be left comparatively unencumbered by binding
guidance. A pro-commission view is a process-oriented recommendation with
few, if any, inherent substantive sentencing consequences.
As Professor Richard Frase’s article highlights, a strong commission can
assist a state in navigating the turbulent constitutional waters of sentencing in a
way that makes sense for a particular locality.37 The Minnesota Sentencing
Commission played a crucial role in guiding its criminal justice system through the
shoals of the post-Blakely world. It has helped Minnesota maintain and improve
its presumptive sentencing guidelines scheme to the general satisfaction of the
relevant decision-makers.38
States often face more pressing, functional concerns than the occasional
constitutional question. One persistent and recurring issue is money. Unlike their
federal counterparts, state lawmakers are often very attuned to prison costs. A
sentencing commission can allow lawmakers to predict and, to some extent,
control corrections costs. In certain jurisdictions, this fiscal role may be a
powerful reason why commissions survive politically and earn their seat at the
34

MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 185–86 (1996).
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT (2003).
36
Chanenson & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 4 (asserting that while not perfect, “accountable
yet independent-minded sentencing commissions are the best frontline policy-making tool that any
jurisdiction can employ”).
37
Richard S. Frase, Blakely in Minnesota: Two Years Out: Guidelines Sentencing is Alive
and Well, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73 (2006); see also Chanenson & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 1.
38
Frase, supra note 37 at 79.
35
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policy-making table.39 Other commissions rely mainly on the strength of a
powerful supporter, frequently a respected member of the judiciary. However it
earns a role in the policy process, the leadership of a sentencing commission can
help innovative ideas germinate and then nurture them as they take root.
As spotlighted by Chief Justice Michael Wolf’s article, the Missouri
Sentencing Advisory Commission offers a shining example of commission
leadership tailored to the needs and environment of its jurisdiction. In Missouri’s
“fully voluntary”40 sentencing system, the “Commission has embarked on an
information-based system to make its wholly discretionary system effective.”41
The initial results of this enormous undertaking have been encouraging. In other
states, the presence and actions of the commission have furthered the stability of
existing state structured sentencing regimes. Professor Frase’s article showcases
just such an experience in Minnesota. The resulting systems in Missouri and
Minnesota are poles apart, but the central role of the sentencing commission stands
out as a unifying feature. Both systems showcase that sentencing commissions
bring together experts who can be responsive to the distinctive needs of their
jurisdictions while pursuing a level of fairness and rationality that can be
particularly elusive in the legislative heat of the moment.42
IV. CONCLUSION
This is an exciting time for state sentencing. With yet another state
sentencing case before the Supreme Court, state systems might start to get some of
the recognition and academic attention they so richly deserve. We hope this
Symposium does its small part. There is a reason many commentators refer to
Justice Brandeis’ description of states as laboratories of democracy;43 it is often
true. In no area of law is that expression more true, more current, and more
39

See Tom Lininger, Oregon’s Response to Blakely, 18 FED. SENT’G. REP. 29, 30 (2005)
(noting that “the Oregon Legislature had a strong stake in predictable sentencing: accurate forecasting
of prison populations is necessary in order to budget money for prison beds.”); cf. Chanenson &
Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 4 (“Sentencing commissions can and should demonstrate not only that
they deserve a seat at the table but also that the others at the table need them to be there.”).
40
See Chanenson, supra note 30, at 409 (discussing definition).
41
Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 95 (2006); see also id. at 99 (“By effective, I mean that the sentence is not
counterproductive and does not encourage the offender to re-offend, but improves the prospects for
avoiding future criminal behavior by the offender.”).
42
Indeed, a few months after the Supreme Court granted review in Cunningham, California’s
Little Hoover Commission started public hearings on sentencing reform with several noted
sentencing authorities from across the country advocating in favor of commissions. See
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/sentencing.html. It would be a fitting testament to state sentencing
innovation and resilience if California could have a commission in place by the end of the Supreme
Court’s term next summer regardless of the result in Cunningham.
43
See, e.g., Chanenson & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 1 & n.1.
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relevant than sentencing. The scientists at the heart of those laboratories are
sentencing commissions. They are each working with their own unique
combination of elements, but they are all striving for real justice.

